Can cooperation be improved between a manager and his staff? A comparative study on the concept of cooperation within music organizations

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the concept of cooperation as it applies to the music industry, more specifically, between a music director and his musicians. The reason justifying this study is that the relationship between a music director and his musicians is a microscopic view of what a relationship is between an employer (a manager) and his employees on a day to day basis (as the musicians usually meet once a week or so). While there has been plenty of studies on leadership in particular, there has been very few attempts at narrowing down the scope of analysis to help researchers better understand what links employers (especially managers) and employees in terms of cooperative efforts. The orchestra setting offers such an opportunity to look at this specific, unique relationship. This article identifies four key manifestations of cooperation and proposes that they could well express themselves in settings other than the director-musicians context, in particular in manager-staff contexts.

Keywords: Observables, cooperation, flexibility, problem-resolution, orientation, communication.

INTRODUCTION

In order to produce a public performance of quality, the conduct and its musicians of any instruments must cooperate. To cooperate, they need a common language; they must display mutual respect and build trust over time (Mancini, 2010). Cooperation tends to occur when all parties involve feel that they have a common goal and that there is a sense of mutual respect and of mutual benefit.

However, at times, the conductor of an orchestra may be perceived as a "predator"; put from a different angle, musicians may feel they are "preys" to the conductor. After all, the all-mighty conductor sits up high, holds a stick, and can make a musician's life miserable if he desires so. The question is thus raised: how does the conductor manage to secure cooperation from the musicians if they perceive him[1] as a "Machiavellian" individual whose sole purpose is his own benefit? This article proposes a model that attempts to show that trust and cooperation are intimately related, and to compare the results to studies done on business dyads. Should it turn out to be the case that results are similar across artistic and business dyads, possible implications would be that some of the theory and experimental findings found in the business dyads scientific literature could well apply to artistic dyads composed of a conductor and its orchestra musicians. This article emphasizes a detailed methodological approach in order to substantiate the view that dyad studies done in B2B environments can share results in the orchestra- maestro settings.

The present article focuses on the aspect of cooperation between a conductor and its musicians, for three reasons. The concept of cooperation, unlike that of trust, is little studied in this particular artistic domain, albeit it is one of the most fundamental basis for producing artistic quality; second, because even in other marketing literature, there has been little effort to define cooperation in all of its intricacies; and thirdly, it would be worth finding out if an artistic conductor-orchestra dyad compares to an interorganizational ("B2B") dyad the like studied, for example, by Anderson & Narus in 1990 (manufacturer-distributor dyad).

An initial attempt is made defining cooperation by looking into the seller-buyer literature, because this is where we find most of scientific research on the subject in the marketing field. A model is then proposed whereby we posit that trust and cooperation are linked, despite the fact that musicians may sometimes feel that the maestro is abusing his power in systematic ways that are reminiscent of the predator aiming at a prey in wild life (Lebrecht, 2001, p. 77). We continue by examining two orchestras herewith named, to preserve anonymity, Indigo and Burgundy. Later, we review our model and conclude by summarizing our key findings with respect to cooperation in the music sector (as compared to the B2B sector) and by proposing research avenues.

UNDERSTANDING COOPERATION

One of the few definitions found in the literature is that of Palmatier, Dant, Grewal & Evans expressed in 2006 according to which "Cooperation captures the level of coordinated and complementary actions between exchange partners in their efforts to achieve mutual goals" (p. 140). Even though this definition is stated in the context of business relationships, it seems

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[1] We use the masculine as a neutral form.

perfectly fit for the conductor-musicians dyads; after all, this dyad is engaged in a formal or informal contract to produce music and is thus acting as a business unit in its own right.

The themes of dialogue and communication are recurrent in scientific publications: multi-levels of communication seem to confirm cooperation intentions between two parties. Communication allows the parties (conductor and musicians in the present case) to (1) build rapport, (2) exchange valuable information, (3) solve problems together and lastly, (4) prove mutual interest. According to Yukl & Falbe (1990), human relations are primarily built through cooperation. Cooperative acts like problem resolution leads to trust (Sirdeshmukh, Singh & Sabol, 2002, p. 28), which in turn may just well invite more cooperation.

Appendix A gives some of the questions created by various authors in an effort to measure cooperation in the seller-buyer context (remembering that a conductor is a salesperson of its own kind: he must sell his way, his interpretation of the musical scores and his quality standards to the musicians). Four variables can be identified that seem to reflect some level of cooperation: (1) flexibility; (2) information exchange; (3) problem resolution; and finally (4) orientation. These four variables (sub-constructs) found to reflect cooperation are discussed in the following sections.

Flexibility

According to Joshi & Arnold (1997, p. 836), flexibility adds up to two other elements characterizing a business relationship, that is exchange of information (called " participation" by Bercovitz, Jap & Nickerson, 2006, p. 726) and solidarity.

Flexibility is expressed, as an example, when two parties do not stick strictly to the terms of their initial agreement, adapting in the process to unplanned events, unpredictable changes and new information (Bercovitz, Jap & Nickerson, 2006, p. 726).

As an example, the conductor will extend the break time in a busy rehearsal to allow for fatigue on the part of some musicians.

Exchange of information

Cooperation is facilitated by information exchanges (Deutsch, 1958; Metcalf, Frear & Krishnan, 1992; Joshi & Arnold, 1997) in a social setting. In the musical context, a conductor and his musicians need to establish a two-way communication and engage towards the goal of a public performance. It may be that a musician has a particular knowledge of the city where the musical group is touring, or else that the conductor knows a particular historical fact about a score that most musicians are unlikely to know.

In the context of small and medium enterprises (keeping in mind an orchestra could be considered a small to medium business unit), Larson notes: "[...] unconventional mechanisms of coordination guiding the collaborative exchanges, including trust, reciprocity and mutual adjustments. In Japanese network firms, trust and mutual obligation enhanced information flows" (1992, p. 77). The initial trust leads to better informational exchanges. Metcalf, Frear & Krishnan also propose that social exchanges loaded with valuable information lead to cooperation (1992, p. 39).

In general, dialogue and efforts to the get closer to the other party persist for the duration of the relationship (see Deutsch, 1958; Metcalf, Frear & Krishnan, 1992; Hovland, Harvey & Sherif, 1957; Morgan & Hunt, 1994). This, according to Anderson & Weitz offers a certain advantage: "Thus, communication, while it does not appear to have a direct impact on the continuity of the relationship, is critical to build trusting relationships that in turn create stability" (1989, p. 320). According to Deutsch "[…] 80 per cent of the subjects who received the full communication treatment trusted the other person and made co-operative choices (e.g. they were 'trustworthy' as well as 'trusting')" (1958, p.274).

There thus seems to exist a cyclical link (Metcalf, Frear & Krishnan, 1992; Deutsch, 1958; Anderson & Narus, 1990) between cooperation and trust, with one leading to the other, and vice-versa, and with trust leading to improved communication (Larson, 1992) and cooperation (Anderson & Narus, 1990; Brooks & Rose, 2008, p. 210), which in turn creates relational stability, thus a sense of equilibrium (Anderson & Weitz, 1989).

In conclusion, a two-way exchange of useful and valid information between each member of the dyad helps creating a trusting climate which, hopefully, will allow taking better decisions.

Joint problem resolution

A study by Metcalf, Frear & Krishnan done in 1992 with engine manufacturers based on the IMP ("European IMP Group") model of trust building indicates that four elements are exchanged in a particular relationship : (1) information about the product (for example, in our case, about the music); (2) money (which may only apply in professional orchestras); (3) general information; and (4) some "sociality", that is, some efforts to create harmonious relationships. They find that two factors influence most particularly cooperation: social exchange and information exchange (dialog).

These exchanges of information can be put in the context of "joint problem solving" as expressed by McNally & Griffin 2007 (p.388). Mohr & Spekman use somewhat of a similar terminology: "conflict resolution techniques" (1994, p. 137-139); idem for Nielson: "problem solving" (1998, p. 449).

While initial messages promoted through two-way communication serve as clues as to the other's intentions (Wood, Boles & Babin, 2008) dialogue serves to create value and to reach a common goal despite obstacles that inevitably litter the road to public performance. Trust is not enough to produce a concert, ongoing, perhaps unexpected problems must also be solved. Palmer, Lindgreen & Vanhamme express this in 2005 as follows: "The dialogue is necessary as a means to support the successful establishment, maintenance, and enhancement of the interaction process" (p. 319).

Thus, joint problem resolution can be defined as a common effort by each side of the dyad (the conductor and his musicians as a group) endeavour to resolve difficulties as they emerge in the process of building trust.

Orientation

A conductor and his musicians must establish a rapport, which requires communication and commitment. In marketing, one talks of "customer orientation", which is influenced by the organization where such action takes place (see Guenzi, 2003, p. 707). Another terminology used is that of "customer centric" (Sheth, Sisodia & Sharma, 2000). One also refers to the customer's orientation (Ryssel, Ritter & Gemünden, 2004, p. 199) towards the seller, which is manifested by a desire to interact with him (McFarland, Challagalla & Shervani, 2006, p.155).

Nielson in 1998 (p. 441) highlights the importance of creating strong ties in order to create a favorable working atmosphere. Each side of the dyad must make efforts to get closer to the other one, failing what no cooperation is possible (Deutsch, 1958; Anderson & Weitz, 1989; Metcalf, Frear & Krishnan, 1992; Joshi & Arnold, 1997; Larson, 1992; Nielson, 1998). Anderson & Weitz (1989, p. 319) come to the conclusion, in 1989, that trust, communication, and mostly orientation are linked; most particularly, trust would affect relational stability.

McFarland, Challagalla & Shervani (2006) add that for some buyers, the relationship to the seller is an important criterion in the evaluation of the transaction: "Buyers with an interaction orientation believe that socialization is a critical aspect of the interaction process. They are interested in forming friendships and fostering interpersonal relationships […]" (p. 107). The same could probably be said to a certain extent in the context of the conductor-musicians dyad: one party's tendency to lean towards the other may help build a stronger relationship.

In concluding this overview, it can be said that the existing literature points towards four sub-constructs reflecting the main construct of cooperation. The term "reflect" is not used arbitrarily. To explain why, the next section compares reflective and formative variables, a distinction that is essential when the time to statistically analyze the available data comes.

MEASURING COOPERATION

In order to measure cooperation (among other constructs) statistically, one must first decide whether its sub-constructs (flexibility, exchange of information, joint problem resolution and orientation) have strong or weak colinearity. This is important because Cronbach's alphas, one of the measures commonly used in similar studies, assume a strong collinearity among the items being measured. However, reflective items do imply strong collinearity, whereas formative ones do not, hence the importance of determining the kind of variables that the cooperation sub-constructs are.

A reflective measure can be intuitively guessed as follows: let's suppose the conductor accepts to change the Monday rehearsal schedule to Tuesday, once every three weeks, to accommodate a few musicians that have other commitments elsewhere. He is showing flexibility. The question is: is this showing of flexibility a proof of cooperation or else does it define cooperation? It could well be that the conductor is not, in fact, willing to change the schedule but accepts with the hope that this will incite the musicians to obey his orders more readily. The fact that he accepts to change the schedule is a proof that he is willing to cooperate: one can infer that because he is adaptive to a particular situation, he is a cooperative person. However, the musicians could find him cooperative even if he had not accepted to change the

schedule : he may compensate his unwillingness to change schedule by spending a fair bit of time discussing his own limits (exchange of information), suggesting other solutions (joint problem resolution) or being kinder with the musicians in general (orientation). Hence, he can be cooperative even though he has not shown flexibility on the subject of a change in schedule.

As seen, many authors arrive to the conclusion that cooperation is manifested by (1) flexibility (Heide & John, 1992; Joshi & Arnold, 1997; Vicenzi & Adkins, 2000; Brennan, Turnbull & Wilson, 2003; Bercovitz, Jap & Nickerson, 2006); (2) exchanges of information (Metcalf, Frear & Krishnan, 1992; Heide & John, 1992; Doney & Cannon, 1997); and (3) joint problem resolution (Heide & John, 1992). Hennig-Thurau, Gwinner & Gremier (2002, p. 234) refer to the importance of customer orientation, incorporating the concept to the notion of opportunism. Blesa & Bigné (2005, p.256)'s questionnaire supposes reflectivity; their question # 15 (see Appendix A) proposes: "We carry out actions to convince our distributors of the advantages of working with us »; their question # 16 adds: "We participate actively in actions that show the usefulness of our industry to the general public". Participants to the questionnaire demonstrate their intention to cooperate by exhibiting specific, measurable behaviours.

Thus, we can assume that the links between the construct of cooperation and that of its sub-constructs are reflective as, according to Jarvis, MacKenzie & Podsakoff's explanations (2003, p. 201), the following conditions are met : (1) measures are interrelated ("measures should possess internal consistency reliability") : flexibility, as an example, is necessary to achieve real and fruitful exchanges of information; and (2) eliminating one sub-construct does not impact the meaning of cooperation : as seen, the Maestro may still be considered cooperative even though he cannot accept a change in schedule.[2] Figure 1sumamrizes this explanation (Appendix)

In the above figure 1, the arrows go from the main construct (cooperation) to the sub-constructs, showing their *reflective* nature. This is not sufficient however to conduct a statistical analysis; we must find at least three questions ("items"- Churchill, 1979, p. 16) for each sub-construct, for a total of 12 questions that will assist us in determining the degree of cooperation between the conductor and his musicians.

Each of these questions is commonly named "observables" in multi-criteria analysis and is *reflective* in nature. The term "observable" conveys the fact that they represent a behaviour that can be observed. For example, a mouse will run away in the presence of a cat. This running away can be observed and is thus an observable. When creating questions for a questionnaire destined to measure cooperation, the researcher must find those that the respondent is willing to respond to, that he can easily interpret as being a manifestation of the sub-construct that it is meant to represent, and that must preferably be answered to (as opposed to "don't know/ does not apply").

Based on the questionnaires found in Appendix A and the above criteria, the following questions (called "observables" and represented by an eye in an oval) have been chosen to measure cooperation:

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[2] Jarvis, MacKenzie & Podsakoff (2003) offer a series of criterias to determine whether an item is reflective or formative.

Flexibility (code G60):

G 61: He adapts to changes, unplanned events.
G 62: He finds ways to adapt to my constraints.
G 63: He shows initiative.

Exchange of information (G70):

G 71: He always keeps me informed.
G 72: He shares his knowledge with me.
G 73: He provides useful informations.

Joint problem resolution (G80):

G 81: We share duties and responsibilities when necessary.
G 82: We take decision together as if we were partners.
G 83: We discuss possible solutions together when facing difficulties.

Orientation (G90):

G 91: He has a keen interest in our relationship.
G 92: He wants our relationship to be beneficial for both of us.
G 93: He wishes to maintain a long-term relationship with me.

It must be noted that each question is not a close resemblance to the other but rather quite different while still aiming at the same sub-construct (questions are not additive ones). This avoids artificially augmenting the Cronbach's alpha and reduces the similarity bias (Bergvist & Rossiter, 2008, p. 87) commonly found in questionnaires. Figure 2 (Appendix) shows the observables plotted in the main sub-constructs frame:
For the trust construct, as it is already highly researched, we used questions inspired by existing literature.

THE STUDY

The main construct of the present article (cooperation) has now been defined and operationalized. This having been done, we now propose a model based on existing models found in the marketing literature (ex.: Anderson & Narus, 1990; Morgan & Hunt 1994; McAllister, 1995; Palmatier, Dant, & Grewal, 2007), but in its simplest form, as follows (Figure 3, Appendix). Even though this model is fairly simple and has been tested in other contexts (for example, manufacturer-distributor dyads in the 1990 Anderson & Narus study), it has not been tested, to the best of our knowledge, in the context of a dyad conductor-musicians. To have data concerning other studies will provide nomological and external validity to our findings, should they be conclusive, or else suggest that the business dyad functions differently than an artistic dyad. The hypothesis that can be formulated is as follows:

Hypothesis 1(H_1) – On the role of cooperation

There is a linear relationship between trust and cooperation in an amateur conductor-orchestra dyad ($\beta_{trust} \neq 0$). Based on past research conducted with business dyads, we expect the correlation coefficient «r» to be high. Of course, the null hypothesis (H_0) is that there is no linear relationship between trust and cooperation in an amateur conductor-orchestra dyad ($\beta_{trust}=0$).

Sampling

Orchestras with a sufficient number of musicians had to be found. Because the present research was exploratory and done without any funding, it was acceptable to find amateur organizations, letting professional orchestras for future researches. Cronbach & Meehl mention in 1955 that it is better to evaluate constructs using various sources (p. 285), hence more than one musical group was thought to be appropriate.

We aimed to find orchestras with at least 50 musicians who would accept to fill out the questionnaire aimed at evaluating their conductor along, in particular, the construct of trust and cooperation. Ten observables per key construct are deemed appropriate for a statistical study; by aiming for 50, this would add more "power" to the findings.

Two conductors from Québec, Canada, graciously accepted to be judged by their musical group after having been met and presented with the questionnaire. However, in the end, we could not gather all 50 musicians at once.

The Indigo orchestra accounted for 32 participants and the Burgundy orchestra for 28. In the week preceding the targeted rehearsal, the project was presented to the group and it was asked for their authorization by a show of hands. Worth mentioning, both orchestras are resolutely classical as opposed to pop oriented.

The musicians took roughly 15 minutes to fill out the entire questionnaire, which included questions about their age, sex and instrument as long as these did not permit the researcher to identify them. Where there was a chance the musician would feel he could be identified, the question was not included in the questionnaire.

RESULTS

Data collected were analyzed using the statistical software SPSS, version 15. Data entry and analysis were done so as to preserve anonymity.

Simple regression analysis was used, a technique vastly employed in marketing: "Regression is the most frequently employed technique in channels (30.5 percent), product (46.5 percent), sales (33.9 percent), and strategy-based research (30.1 percent)" (Dahlstrom, Nygaard & Crosno, 2008, p.148). Two initial questions the researchers had were: (1) what is the degree of relationship between the two constructs (to be found by Pearson's product moment coefficient "r"[3])? (2) What kind of constructs (variables) are present (identified herewith as continuous non-paired)? Hence, in this context, ANOVA and regressions are appropriate, and we decided on the vastly used $\alpha = 0.05$.

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[3] "This coefficient is the standard measure of the linear relationship between two variables […]" (Cohen & Cohen, 1983, p. 36).

The least square regression analysis was favoured because, as Roehrich explains in 2001 (p. 88), this approach is suitable for small samples, which is the present case.

Summated responses for the sub-constructs and then for the entire cooperation construct were used. According to Michon & Chebat (2008): "More so, summated rating scales do not resolve measurement errors because they assume that all items have the same weight" (p. 300), but then, there are no reasons to believe that the observables have different weights. In fact, as part of the definition of the term "observables", we qualify them as always purely reflective and always of equal weights, which helps standardize the results.

It is not possible to find causal links between trust and cooperation (which would require a longitudinal study and would be a risky exercise (see Brannen, 1992; Ackoff, 1957, p.7; Buchanan & Bryman, 2007, p.494; Neuman, 1994, p.43, 99; Brewer & Hunter, 1989, p.42, 149; Miles & Huberman, 2003, p. 273; Cossette & Lapointe, 1997, p. 49), however better understanding behaviours and most particularly the relationship between trust and cooperation is by itself of value for the conductor who wishes to improve his performance (see Grenier et Josserand, 1999, p. 108). Adjusted r^2 are used for multiple regression as opposed to normal r^2 used for simple regressions.

Cronbach's alphas can only be done on reflective items (observables) since these are expected to have high collinearity as opposed to formative items. Furthermore, they are sensitive to the number of questions (due to their mathematical formulation) asked and thus run the risk of being manipulated in order to increase their value. Also of concern is the fact that high Cronbach's alphas are often sought by making each question a close copy of the next one, which has the potential detrimental effects of confusing the participant (who can't readily make a sound judgment as to what is exactly is the difference between the similar questions) and of not grasping the entire meaning of the construct the questions are supposed to express (as the focus is on repeating similar questions rather than looking at the construct from different angles). This study tried to avoid these traps with the 12 questions identified earlier in this article. The results of the Cronbach's alphas for the two musical groups are as follows (Table 3, Appendix):

As can be seen, none of the questions (except in one case, G81 for the Burgundy group, which we decided to keep) in either group can be withdrawn without reducing the normalized Cronbach's alphas. Hence, the questions that we have identified seem to be appropriate for the purpose of our analysis. Simple and multiple regressions can now be performed.

Simple linear regressions

One of the goals of this study was to find out the r^2 of the relationship between trust and cooperation, and then to run an ANOVA and simple regressions ensuring in the process the normality of population and residuals. A strong link found between trust and cooperation, as discovered in other studies, would be an indication that the measure proposed in the present article for cooperation has some validity.

The results are as follows for each orchestra, with Y= cooperation and X= trust. Worth mentioning is the quality of the regression linear model (Table 2, Appendix) exemplified by the cigar shape of the regression curves.

R^2 is the *proportion* of the variance of cooperation associated with trust (see Cohen & Cohen, 1983, p. 47). The ANOVAs were significant to the fixed level. With a risk of error of 1 over 20, there is sufficient statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis H_{0H} according to

which there is no significant linear relationship between trust and cooperation in the population, as the *p*-value at $0,000 < \alpha = 0,05$. For the both group, since « r » equals 0.832 (for an r^2 of 0,693) for Indigo and «r» equals 0.921 (for an r^2 of 0.848) , we can interpret the relationship as *very strong* (see Davis' table in Appendix B and Cohen & Cohen, 1983).

The high values meet with the value found in the 1990 Anderson & Narus study on business dyads (using Structural Equation Modeling) at 0.73 for cooperation leading to trust (p. 50), the one found by Morgan & Hunt 1994 at 0.134 level with trust leading to cooperation in the proposed model using SEM (p. 30), by McAllister in 1995 with affect-based trust being leading to "manager assistance citizenship behaviour" at 0.56 (*p*-value < 0.001) (p. 48), and finally by Palmatier, Dant, Grewal & Evans in 2006 at r= 0.73 (p. 149). Hence, our finding seems to have nomological validity as well as external validity, since in this latter case, both types of dyads (business and artistic) exhibit high correlations between trust and cooperation.

The regressions are as follows (with *p*-value at 0.000 in both cases):

Indigo
Cooperation = $\beta_{0} + \beta_{trust}$Trust + ε

Or:

Cooperation =- 0.733 +0.984 Trust + ε

Burgundy

Cooperation = 7.716 + 0.845 Trust + ε

The regression coefficient β_{trust} indicates that for each "unit" of increase in trust, there is an estimated change of nearly 1 change in units of cooperation (see Cohen & Cohen, 1983, p. 43).

Note that at the pre-established significance level of $\alpha = 0.05$, there is no sufficient evidence to reject the hypothesis H_{0R} according to which residuals follow a normal law (with H_{1R} being that the residuals do not follow a normal law*)*, since the Kolmogoroff-Smirnoff (KS) and Shapiro-Wilks (SW) values are greater or equal to the 0.05 value (0.200 and 0.266 respectively for Indigo, and 0.200 and 0.432 for Burgundy). This hypothesis is thus likely and the linear regression is deemed probable.

Hypothesis (H_1) – On the role of cooperation: confirmed

The key finding is that there is a linear relationship between trust and cooperation in an amateur conductor-orchestra dyad ($\beta_{trust} \neq 0$). Based on past research conducted with business dyads, we can estimate that business and artistic dyads behave similarly.

Multiple linear regressions

Since four sub-constructs for the construct of cooperation had been identified, it was worth doing the exercise of finding which one of these sub-constructs had more influence on the

construct of trust (since we came to the conclusion that at the height of the relation between the conductor and its musicians there was a reciprocal link between trust and cooperation). VIF ("variance inflation factors") were between 1 and 10 (at approximately 1.4 and 3.0), therefore acceptable – multicollinearity was not a problem; the ANOVA p-values were at 0.000. Table 3 (Appendix) gives the results for the two orchestral groups.

We note that in both cases, the sub-construct "Exchange of information" has the strongest influence of trust, having the highest non-standardized β values and nearly the highest t values. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that musicians in both groups expect their conductor to exchange information with them, and that this is more important, on average, than the conductor showing flexibility, trying to resolve problems with them, or showing a musician's orientation.

REVISED MODEL

We can review our initial model by eliminating the two-way arrows and simply showing the intersection between trust and cooperation using the average r^2 calculated from the two musical groups considered, as follows (see Cohen & Cohen, 1983, p. 47). See Figure 4 – Revised model in the Appendix. Where r^2 equals approximately 0.900 on average; and $(1 – r^2)$ equals approximately 0.100 on average.

Inasmuch as this model is very simple, it does not need to be complex: the amount of information it carries for the conductor-musicians dyad viewpoint has important applications. In this figure, $1-r^2$ is the proportion of variance of cooperation not linearly associated with trust or cooperation (see Cohen & Cohen, 1983, p. 47).

Of importance for this study, this model and the values obtained through the current study seem to indicate that the measurement of cooperation in the present article has some nomological validity. Since an orchestra is similar in many ways to typical organizations, especially those geared towards project management, it can be assumed that the definition provided for cooperation in this article could well apply to other organizations than the mere director-musicians setting.

CONCLUSION

This article initially discussed the fact that cooperation is seldom well-identified or adequately operationalized in the marketing literature. An attempt was have made at identifying four sub-constructs that reflect cooperation, that is (1) flexibility, (2) exchange of information, (3) joint problem resolution, and (4) orientation. Of these four sub-constructs, exchange of information seems to be the most important one to the musicians.

Two groups of musicians were asked to fill out a questionnaire aiming at evaluating most particularly their perceived image of their conductor in terms of cooperation. Is he a cooperative individual or else is he a tyrant (a "predator") who wants to impose himself at any cost, for his own benefit (Lebrecht, 2001, p.11)? Furthermore, we wanted to verify whether the results of previous studies done in a *business context* with respect to the link between trust and cooperation were similar to results found in an artistic organization. Remarkable similarities were noted, with high correlations values, suggesting that the seller-buyer literature could well find applications in the musical sector and vice-versa. This can be explained by the fact that a musical organization the like of an amateur orchestra is indeed an organization, with pressures to perform, money

needed to operate, and tensions between individuals to deal with. This seems to have an important implication: the researcher could rely on results from B2B studies (which are numerous) to infer on the dynamic of exchanges between a maestro and his orchestra.

This research was meant to be exploratory and simple in nature. Limits are inevitable, such as the fact that only amateur orchestras were part of the research and the fact that the number of participants was limited.

This article may help opening some doors to better understanding the relationship between a conductor and his musicians and between an employer and employees. More operationalization is needed to activate the four sub-constructs that reflect cooperation in specific business sectors: for example, how can the manager show more flexibility towards his employees (flexible work hours, special leave of absence, etc.)? The underlying assumption being that by showing flexibility, the employer invites his staff to cooperate more. Similarly, the manager could be tempted to issue an monthly journal to improve communication with employees or else create special round tables with employees to discuss and solve together operational problems. All in all, it is only by better understanding what leads employees to believe that the employer is willing to cooperate (through tangible manifestations of the four sub-constructs) that these employees will in turn be more inclined to cooperate, and vice-versa. Obviously, the music director is a manager in his own right: he has to accomplish administrative tasks, manage employees others than musicians, deal with the public and governments and so forth. Lessons learn on cooperation from his interaction with the musicians, whom he meets often only once a week, may well serve in his day-to-day managerial routine work.

This opens the way to further research with the expectations that a more cooperative working environment would lead to increased profitability to the firm.

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APPENDIX A

Blesa & Bigné (2005)

"Market orientation"

#15. We carry out actions to convince our distributors of the advantages of working with us.
#16. We participate actively in actions that show the social usefulness of our industry to the general public.

Campbell, Graham, Jolibert & Meissner (1988), Adler & Graham (1989)

Problem-solving approach
Rate your own bargaining strategies on the following scales:

Solving a mutual problem
1.   Exploitative 5,4,3,2,1 Accommodating
2.   Honest 5,4,3,2,1 Deceptive
3.   Informative 5,4,3,2,1 Persuasive
4.   Unbiased 5,4,3,2,1 Biased

Interpersonal Attraction
1.   How comfortable did you feel with the particular person with whom you were paired? Comfortable 5,4,3,2,1 uncomfortable
2.   How interested were you in the person with whom you were paired? Interested 5,4,3,2,1 Uninterested
3.   How interested would you be in seeing the person with whom you were paired again?
4.   Interested 5,4,3,2,1 Uninterested

Heide & John (1992, p. 37)

7-point scale: completely inaccurate description/completely accurate description

Norm of flexibility
1.   Flexibility is response to requests for changes is a characteristic of this relationship.
2.   The parties expect to be able to make adjustments in the ongoing relationship to cope with changing circumstances.
3.   When some unexpected situation arises, the parties would rather work out a new deal than hold each other to the original terms.

Norm of information
1.   In this relationship, it is expected that any information that might help the other party will be provided to them.

2. Exchange of information in this relationship takes place frequently and informally, and not only according to a prespecified agreement.
3. It is expected that the parties will provide proprietary information if it can help the other party.
4. It is expected that we keep each other informed about events or changes that may affect the other party.

Norm of solidarity
1. Problems that arise in the course of this relationship are treated by the parties as joint rather than individual responsibilities.
2. The parties are committed to improvements that may benefit the relationship as a whole, and not only the individual parties.
3. The parties in this relationship do not mind owing each other favors.

Heide & Miner (1992, p. 287)

7-point scale: completely inaccurate description/completely accurate description

Flexibility
1. Flexibility is response to requests for changes is a characteristic of this relationship.
2. When some unexpected situation arises, the parties would rather work out a new deal than hold each other to the original terms.
3. It is expected that the parties will be open to modifying their agreements if unexpected events occur.
4. Changes in «fixed» are not rules out by the parties, if it is considered necessary.

Information exchange
1. In this relationship, it is expected that any information that might help the other party will be provided to them.
2. Exchange of information in this relationship takes place frequently and informally, and not only according to a prespecified agreement.
3. It is expected that the parties will provide proprietary information if it can help the other party.
4. It is expected that we keep each other informed about events or changes that may affect the other party.

Shared problem solving
1. In most aspects of this relationship the parties are jointly responsible for getting things done.
2. Problems that arise in the course of this relationship are treated by the parties as joint rather than individual responsibilities.
3. The parties in this relationship do not mind owing each other favors.
4. The responsibility for making sure that the relationship works for both us and this supplier is shared jointly.

Restraint in the use of power
1.   The parties feel it is important not to use proprietary information to the other party's disadvantage.
2.   A characteristic of this relationship is that either party is expected to make demands that might be damaging to the other.
3.   The parties expect the more powerful party to restrain the use of his power in attempting to get his way.

Extendedness of relationship
(1= «completely inaccurate description»; to 7 = «completely accurate description»)

1.   The parties expect this relationship to last a lifetime.
2.   It is assumed that renewal of agreements in this relationship will generally occur.
3.   The parties make plans not only for the terms of individual purchases, but also for the continuance of the relationship.
4.   The relationship with this supplier is essentially "evergreen".

Metcalf, Frear & Krishnan (1992, p. 45)

Information exchange
1.   Buyer/seller usually provides technical documentation in substantial detail.
2.   The technical information supplied by buyer/seller is often inadequate.
(Items were adapted from the IMP research and scored on a five-point scale with end-points: 1= strongly disagree and 5= strongly agree.)

Social exchange

1.   We like dealing with buyer/seller.
2.   Buyer/seller has a good understanding of our problems as buyers/sellers.
3.   We have full confidence in the information provided to us by buyer/seller.
4.   Buyer/seller generally has a poor understanding of how our company operates.
5.   It is difficult to make personal friends with purchasing people/salespersons and technical people from the buyer's/seller's company.

Co-operation
1.   Purchasing/marketing people from buyer's/seller's company co-operate closely with us.
2.   Purchasing people/salespersons from buyer's/seller's company frequently contact us.
3.   Purchasing people3salespersons quickly respond to our requests for a call.
4.   Buyer/seller is particularly interested in following up on how the seller's products are used.
(Items were adapted from the IMP research and scored on a five-point scale with end-points: 1= strongly disagree and 5= strongly agree.)

Adaptation
1.   Buyer/seller is often interested in joint product development activities.

2.   Buyer/seller is receptive to/offers us new technical solutions.
3.   Buyer/seller often suggests that we jointly co-ordinate our production plans.
(Items were adapted from the IMP research and scored on a five-point scale with end-points: 1=
        strongly disagree and 5= strongly agree.)

Morgan & Hunt (1994, p. 35)

Communication
1.   In our relationship, my major supplier (anchors: strongly agree/strongly disagree)
            …keeps us informed of new developments.
            … communicates well his expectations for our firm's performance.

Opportunistic behavior
1.   To accomplish his own objectives, sometimes my supplier (anchors: strongly
            agree/strongly disagree)
            ...alters the facts slightly.
            …promises to do things without actually doing them later.

Ganesan (1994, p. 15)

1.   Long term orientation between retailer and vendor as resources)
2.   We believe that over the long run our relationship with this resource will be profitable.
3.   Maintaining a long-term relationship with this resource is important to us.
4.   We focus on long-term goals in this relationship.
5.   We are willing to make sacrifices to help this resource from time to time.

Ellram & Hendrick (1995, p. 48)

Futuristic orientation
Focus on current/future transactions.
1.   High/Low expectations of a long-term relationship.
2.   Our written agreements rely on termination dates are ongoing.
3.   Supplier was chosen by this buyer based on price/total cost of ownership.

McAllister (1995, p. 40)

Performance measure
1.   Overall, to what extent do you feel that this person is performing his/her total job the way
            you would like it to be performed?
2.   To what extent has this person met all of your expectations in his/her roles and
            responsibilities?
3.   If you had your way, to what extent would you change the manner in which this person is
            doing his/her job?

McAllister (1995, p. 37)

Affiliatative citizenship behavior
1.   I take time to listen to this person's problems and worries.
2.   I have taken a personal interest in this individual.
3.   I frequently do extra things I know I won't be rewarded for, but which make my cooperative efforts with this person more productive.
4.   I pass on new information that might be useful to this person.
5.   I willingly help this individual, even at some cost to personal productivity.
6.   When making decisions at work that affect this individual, I try to take his/her needs and feelings into account.
7.   I try not to make things more difficult for this person by my careless actions.

Assistance-oriented citizenship behavior
1.   I help this person with difficult assignments, even when assistance is not directly requested.
2.   I assist this person with heavy work loads, even though it is not part of my job.
3.   I help this person when (s) he has been absent.

Doney & Cannon (1997, p. 48, 49)

Frequent contact with salesperson
1.   This salesperson frequently visits our place of business.
2.   This salesperson takes a lot of time learning our needs.
3.   This salesperson spends considerable time getting to know our people.

Smith (1998, p. 12)

Relationship quality
1.   Can count on rep.
2.   Respect rep's judgement.
3.   Wouldn't take advantage.
4.   Long-term partnership

Smith (1998, p. 18)

Communication Openness (adapted from Anderson & Weitz, 1989)
1.   We talk candidly with each other.
2.   Sometimes s/he does not tell me everything I need to know.
3.   I am responsive to his/her need for information.
4.   Our communication is open and honest.

Antón, Camarero & Carrero (2007, p. 157)

Perceived commitment
1.   The company a frequent and constant relationship with me
2.   The company gives me full and useful information about its products
3.   I think the company is committed to me as a customer
4.   I feel I get special benefits for being a good customer
5.   The company is flexible in adapting its offer to my specific needs

Mallalieu & Nakamoto (2008, p. 196)

Goal facilitation (orientation)
1.   I feel that Bob's primary concern is to help me make a decision.
2.   I feel that Bob is trying to meet my needs.
3.   I feel that Bob is trying to understand my goal.
4.   I feel that Bob has my best interests in mind.
5.   I feel that if I continue to deal with Bob, I would achieve my goals.
6.   I feel that Bob is trying to influence me through useful information rather than pressure.

APPENDIX B

Davis' table

Normes de Davis

$0,7$	$\leq$	$\lvert r \rvert$	$\leq$	1	Interrelation linéaire très forte
$0,5$	$\leq$	$\lvert r \rvert$	$<$	$0,7$	Interrelation linéaire forte
$0,3$	$\leq$	$\lvert r \rvert$	$<$	$0,5$	Interrelation linéaire modérée
$0,1$	$\leq$	$\lvert r \rvert$	$<$	$0,3$	Interrelation linéaire faible
0	$\leq$	$\lvert r \rvert$	$<$	$0,1$	Interrelation linéaire négligeable

Cronbach's alphas

Alpha de Cronbach

$0,6$	$\leq$	α	$\leq$	$0,7$	médiocre
$0,7$	$<$	α	$\leq$	$0,8$	moyen
$0,8$	$<$	α	$\leq$	$0,9$	très bien
$0,9$	$<$	α	$\leq$	1	excellent

Figure 1 – Cooperation and its sub-constructs (reflective variables)



Figure 2 – Cooperation and its (*reflective*) observables

Figure 3 – A model for trust and cooperation

Table 1 – Cronbach's alphas

| *Indigo*		*Burgundy*	
Cronbach's alpha: 0.731 (normalized at 0.754)		Cronbach's alpha: 0.922 (normalized at 0.925)	
	Cronbach's alpha if item withdrawn		Cronbach's alpha if item withdrawn
SMEAN(G61)	,697	SMEAN(G61)	,919
SMEAN(G62)	,730	SMEAN(G62)	,917
SMEAN(G63)	,719	SMEAN(G63)	,911
SMEAN(G71)	,699	SMEAN(G71)	,917
SMEAN(G72)	,726	SMEAN(G72)	,913
SMEAN(G73)	,732	SMEAN(G73)	,921
SMEAN(G81)	,719	SMEAN(G81)	,929
SMEAN(G82)	,703	SMEAN(G82)	,915
SMEAN(G83)	,695	SMEAN(G83)	,910
SMEAN(G91)	,672	SMEAN(G91)	,909
SMEAN(G92)	,736	SMEAN(G92)	,911
SMEAN(G93)	,726	SMEAN(G93)	,909

Table 2 – Trust => cooperation

Trust => cooperation	R; R²	Graphs	
		Regression *(clear cigar shape)*	Residuals *(all included between 3 and -3)*
Indigo (n = 32)[4]	0.832; 0.693		
Burgundy (n= 28; F = 144.833; *p*-value= 0.000)	0.921; 0.848		

Table 3 – Trust and the four cooperation sub-constructs

Indigo

Coefficients [a]

		Coefficients non standardisés		Coefficients standardisés			Statistiques de colinéarité	
Modèle		B	Erreur standard	Bêta	t	Signification	Tolérance	VIF
1	(constante)	17,028	7,443		2,288	,030		
	FL_Tot	,725	,375	,241	1,930	,064	,700	1,429
	EI_Tot	1,048	,401	,310	2,614	,014	,772	1,296
	RC_Tot	,692	,251	,345	2,757	,010	,695	1,439
	OR_Tot	,551	,255	,270	2,162	,040	,696	1,436

a. Variable dépendante : Conf_Tot

---

[4] N=32; F=67.601; df_{reg}=1; dl_{resid}=30; *p*-value= 0,000.

Burgundy

Coefficients [a]

Modèle		Coefficients non standardisés		Coefficients standardisés	t	Signification	Statistiques de colinéarité	
		B	Erreur standard	Bêta			Tolérance	VIF
1	(constante)	-5,402	5,266		-1,026	,316		
	G60_Tot	1,317	,496	,320	2,657	,014	,321	3,117
	G70_Tot	1,828	,499	,425	3,661	,001	,344	2,905
	G80_Tot	,429	,360	,122	1,192	,245	,443	2,256
	G90_Tot	,671	,408	,207	1,647	,113	,293	3,409

a. Variable dépendante : Conf_Tot

Figure 4 – Revised model